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Why did the Supreme Court rule that the issue of foresight had been misinterpreted for 




Joint enterprise is an area of law that has no statutory definition; instead being developed 
through the common law. It involves situations where more than one defendant can be 
convicted of the same crime, even if the co-defendant did not play an active role in the crime 
and, since it is common law based, many would argue (including Ben Crewe, a scholar)  that 
the laws surrounding it have been created in a ‘hazardous way’.1 This has ultimately resulted 
in the Supreme Court ruling in 2016 that the law had been misinterpreted for the past 30 years- 
and judges had been using the law to wrongfully convict people2, with a major factor being the 
issue of foresight had been misunderstood. In the past the jury had been able to use proof of 
foresight of a crime as a suitable mens rea for joint enterprise, a lower mens rea threshold than 
for other convictions of murder3 and post 2016 this is no longer the case. This essay will 
therefore explore the leading case where the decision to overturn the law was made, what 
happened prior to 2016 and any appeal cases and the social context of joint enterprise 
legislation. 
 
Leading Case  
In 2016, the law surrounding joint enterprise was turned on its head when the Supreme Court, 
in the case of R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan)4, was asked to review the doctrine of parasitic 
accessory liability that had been laid down by the Privy Council 30 years earlier in the case of 
Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen5. Ultimately, the Court decided it could not support the Chan 
Wing-Siu principle, since the introduction of the principle was based on “an incomplete, and 
in some respects erroneous, reading of the previous case law, coupled with generalised and 
questionable policy arguments”6 - a decision that would likely have big consequences for past 
and future rulings in the area of joint enterprise alike. 
                                               
1 Ben Crewe et al ‘Joint enterprise: the implications of an unfair and unclear law’ (2015) Issue 4 Criminal law 
Review 252 
2  R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 
3 Ibid 
4 [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 
5 [1985] 1 AC 168 
6 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 
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In the case it was alleged by the prosecution that the defendant had participated in joint 
enterprise with his co-defendant to commit an act which resulted in the victim’s death.7 The 
judge advised the jury that the defendant was guilty of murder if he had participated in the 
attack and “realised” that his co-defendant might stab the victim with intent to cause him “really 
serious harm”.8 The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, with the 
Court of Appeal later dismissing the defendant’s appeal against conviction. The defendant 
appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the judge’s directions to the jury on joint 
enterprise were incorrect and that the case law, which was binding on trial judges in regard to 
the directions given to the jury, needed to be reviewed. It was argued that foresight that a risk 
might come about was far too low a level of fault for secondary liability.9 The appeal was 
allowed as it was stated that the Chan Wing-Siu principle could not be supported and the 
judgement was overturned. 
Although reversing a statement of principle, which had been made and followed by the Privy 
Council and House of Lords on numerous occasions over many years, was undoubtedly a big 
(and rare) step, it was the right decision for several reasons. The first of these is that the court, 
in 2016, arguably had the benefit of a ‘much deeper and extensive analysis of the topic of so-
called “joint enterprise” liability than on previous occasions when the topic was considered.’10 
When reviewing the authorities, there is now little doubt that the Privy Council laid down a 
new principle in Chan when it held that if two people set out to commit an offence (crime A), 
and in the course of it one of them commits another offence (crime B), the second person is 
guilty as an accessory to crime B if he foresaw it as a possibility, but did not necessarily intend 
it.11 Some of the authorities the Privy Council relied upon in laying down this principle was 
Davies v DPP12 and R v Anderson; R v Morris13. In R v Anderson; R v Morris the Court of 
Appeal affirmed R v Smith (Wesley)14 including the rule that “if an adventurer departed 
completely from what had been tacitly agreed as part of an agreed joined enterprise then his 
co-adventurer would not be liable for the consequences of the unauthorised act. In such a 
situation the effect of the overwhelming supervening act is that any assistance is spent.”15 The 
                                               
7 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2013] EWCA Crim 1433, [2013] 7 WLUK 365 
8 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid [61] 
11 Ibid [62] 
12 [1954] AC 378; [1954] 2 WLR 343 
13 [1966] 2 QB 110; [1966] 2 WLR 1195 
14 [1963] 1 WLR 1200; [1963] 3 All ER 597 
15 R v Anderson (Lascelles Fitzalbert) [1966] 2 QB 110; [1966] 2 WLR 1195 
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Court did not otherwise address the question of what is necessary to establish joint 
responsibility, and specifically what is required is intention to assist or mere foresight of what 
D1 might do. Still less did it address the meaning of foresight or authorisation, so it provided 
no foundation to the rule in Chan.16 Also, as pointed out by Lord Brown of Eaton-under-
Heywood in R v Rahman (Islamur)17 “the rule in Chan makes guilty those who foresee crime 
B but never intended it/ wanted it to happen. Although there can be no doubt that if D2 
continues to participate in crime A with foresight that D1 may commit crime B, that is evidence, 
and sometimes powerful evidence, of an intent to assist D1 in crime B. But it is evidence of 
such intent, not conclusive of it.”18 Additionally, a second reason for this change in direction 
can be argued to be due to the fact that it could not be said that the law was now well established 
and working satisfactorily; joint enterprise had remained a highly controversial area of law and 
a continuing source of difficulty for trial judges.19 It has hence led to a number of appeals, 
some of which will be mentioned later on in this essay. Furthermore, a third reason why it was 
decided that a change to the law was necessary was that, since secondary liability was an 
important part of the common law, if the judges felt that a wrong turn had been taken it should 
be corrected.20 In the language of criminal law ‘a person who assists or encourages another to 
commit a crime is known as an accessory/secondary party, with the actual perpetrator known 
as a principal. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that the accessory is guilty of the 
same offence as the principle- he shares the same physical act because even if it was not his 
hand that struck the blow, he has encouraged or assisted the physical act. These principals are 
well established and uncontroversial.’21 It is only within the last 20 years that a new term, 
“parasitic accessory liability” has entered the realm of criminal lawyers, first coined by 
Professor Sir John Smith in 1997 to describe the doctrine laid down in Chan and developed in 
later cases, including most importantly, in the decision of the House of Lords in R v Powell 
(Anthony Glassford); R v English22.23 Therefore, as to the argument that, even if the court was 
satisfied that the law took the wrong turn, any correction should now be left to Parliament, the 
doctrine of secondary liability is a common law doctrine and, if it has been unduly widened by 
the courts, it was proper for the courts to correct the error.24 Another reason for this change is 
                                               
16 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 [64] 
17 [2008] UKHL 45; [2009] 1 AC 129 [63] 
18 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 [66] 
19 Ibid [81] 
20 Ibid [82] 
21 Ibid [1] 
22 [1999] 1 AC 1; [1997] 3 WLR 959 
23 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 [2] 
24 Ibid [85] 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Student Journal of Professional Practice and Academic Research 
78 
Northumbria University – ISSN 2632-0452 – All content CC-BY 4.0 
that, in the common law, ‘foresight’ of what happened was ordinarily no more than evidence 
that the jury may infer requisite intention from. It might be strong evidence but its adoption as 
a test for the mental element of murder in the case of a secondary party was a ‘serious and 
anomalous’ departure from the basic rule resulting in an overextension of the law of murder 
and a reduction of the law of manslaughter.25 Murder already has a relatively low mens rea 
threshold (only an intention to cause serious injury) and the Chan principle extended liability 
for murder to a secondary party on the basis of an even lesser degree of culpability (foresight 
of the possibility that the principle might commit murder, with no need for an intention to assist 
him).26 Finally, the rule had a striking anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt 
in the case of the accessory than the principal, the cases of Chan and Powell superseded.27 
Therefore the Supreme Court correctly decided that the proper course of action was to restate 
the principles that had been established over the course of many years before the court took a 
wrong turn in Chan. The error was ‘to equate foresight with the intent to assist, as a matter of 
law; the correct approach is to treat foresight as evidence of intent’28 and nothing more. 
Before and After 1985 
One of the most famous cases involving joint enterprise before the Chan ruling was a case 
surrounding a burglary in 1953. Within this case, the police arrived at the scene and restrained 
both Derek Bentley29 and Christopher Craig; asking Craig to hand over the gun he was in 
possession of. Once PC Sydney Miles asked this, Bentley shouted out the ambiguous phrase 
“let him have it”, which was overheard by three other policemen at the scene and this evidence 
was given in court as a means of encouragement and hence the basis of the court’s judgement 
when deciding joint enterprise. The role of foresight within this case was Bentley not only 
knowing that there was going to be a crime committed, but also inciting Craig to shoot the 
policeman by using that phrase.  
A more modern case (after the Chan judgement) involves Jordan Cunliffe30 who was convicted 
alongside others of the murder of Gary Newlove and sentenced to a minimum of 12 years in 
prison. Due to this being gang related, and that he had already caused damage and behaved 
aggressively, these were both aggravating factors within the law. He watched and took part in 
                                               
25 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 [83] 
26 Ibid  
27 Ibid [84] 
28 Ibid [87] 
29 R v Bentley (Deceased) [1998] 7 WLUK 610 
30 R v Cunliffe (Jordan) [2010] EWCA crim 2483  
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the beating up of the victim, therefore this was the role of foresight as he knew there was a risk 
of serious injury and did nothing to avoid it. Although, this has been seen as controversial as it 
was witnessed by Cunliffe, he did not deliver the fatal kick, however the courts saw it fitting 
to convict him of murder.   
R v Smith31 is a case, shortly after the Chan ruling, concerning grievous bodily harm, where 
both people agreed to do some harm, but not serious harm. However, the other defendant 
changed his mind and decided to inflict really serious bodily harm on the victim. Due to joint 
enterprise, Smith was also convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. It was 
decided in court that Smith had ‘foreseen’ that his partner might have attacked him viciously 
and did nothing to prevent this. It was found to be highly controversial as he should not have 
been convicted of the crime another committed just because he was there to witness it. These 
cases, along with many others, were vital in the decision made by the Supreme Court around 
the issue of foresight being misinterpreted. 
Appeals 
As for where the law currently stands and how judges examine who was wrongfully convicted, 
the new law states that the correct approach should have been to treat foresight as evidence 
rather than assuming that it was intent, but what about those who have been wrongfully 
convicted? The case of R v Johnson gives us a much clearer understanding of how the new law 
works and how judges decide on new appeals. R v Johnson32 reveals “Section 2(2) (of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1868) emphasised that…the court should only allow the appeal if it 
thought that the conviction was unsafe”33. The meaning of unsafe in this context is “a legal 
decision that someone is guilty may be wrong because it is based on bad evidence”34. 
R v Johnson emphasises that for an appeal to be upheld, a “substantial injustice” must have 
been done. This corroborates R v Jogee which states that “Courts have the power to grant such 
leave, and may do so if substantial injustice be demonstrated, but it will not do so simply 
because the law applied has now been declared to have been mistaken”35. This hence reveals 
why there have been very few appeal cases, as even if convicted under an incorrect law, your 
appeal will not succeed unless there was substantial injustice. The courts expand on this during 
                                               
31 R v Smith [1988] 4 WLUK 131  
32 [2016] EWCA Crim 1613 
33 Ibid 
34 ‘Unsafe’ Cambridge Dictionary <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/unsafe> 
35 R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8; [2017] AC 387 [100] 
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the case of R v Burton,36 stating that “it was not appropriate to reduce an otherwise appropriate 
minimum term because a co-accused might have been treated leniently, unless the difference 
in sentencing would cause right-thinking members of the public to consider that the offender 
had a justified sense of grievance.”. In short, this means an appeal would only be appropriate 
if the general public thought the offender had been handed a grossly unjust sentence. 
Of the appeals that have taken place, the majority have been dismissed by the courts including 
the aforementioned R v Johnson37 and R v Burton38 as the courts  believed there had been no 
substantial injustice. However, one of the few appeals that have been successful was that of R 
v Crilly39. Crilly was convicted of murder when he and his friends broke into the flat of a 71 
year old man who they believed to be out of the flat. In reality, the victim was in the flat but 
could not hear the doorbell due to a hearing impairment. When Crilly found that there was a 
man inside, he insisted that he and his friends leave the flat and he went outside whereas his 
friends stayed to rob the victim and then punched him in the face which caused his death. The 
courts allowed his appeal on the premise that if it was denied then substantial injustice would 
have been caused as the foresight that Crilly may have had did not equate to intent as he was 
not aware the victim was in the flat beforehand. 
Social Context  
As for the social context of joint enterprise, it was found that few media sources such as 
newspapers and documentaries, have focused on the misinterpretation of foresight, the majority 
of sources predominantly focusing on the negative impact of joint enterprise within the law by 
looking at the offender’s perspective. Many newspapers believe ‘that the law has been used to 
target young people from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds by associating them 
unjustifiably with ‘gangs’.40 An academic from Manchester Metropolitan University 
conducted a survey which showed that ‘87 percent of those on the Metropolitan Police ‘gang 
matrix’ (Trident) were black and minority ethnic...half of those convicted of serious youth 
violence were black and minority ethnic people’41. This reinforces the argument that joint 
                                               
36 [2017] EWCA Crim 107; [2017] 1 WLUK 446; 
37 [2016] EWCA Crim 1613 
38 [2017] EWCA Crim 107; [2017] 1 WLUK 466; 
39 [2018] EWCA Crim 168 
40Owen Bowcott, ‘Senior Tories urge government to review joint enterprise laws’ The Guardian (25 January 
2018)  
41Patrick Williams and Becky Clark, ‘Are joint enterprise convictions racially motivated?’ (2016) 1 (1) MMU 
<https://www2.mmu.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/story/?id=4088> accessed 21 November 2018 
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enterprise is; ‘the lazy prosecutor’s dream’42 as it can be used by judges as a tool to remove all 
potential offenders even if they did not participate substantially. However, this is controversial 
as many gangs (potential offenders) happen to be of an ethnic background, which has given the 
public a bad perception of the law on joint enterprise (explaining why many media sources 
have written about the bad implications of joint enterprise only). 
Nevertheless, away from the negative portrayal of joint enterprise, one particular media source 
did discuss why joint enterprise is beneficial to society. For instance for ‘young women that 
have been so traumatised or drugged that they are unable to provide an account of exactly 
which suspect did what to them during a sexual assault but their testimony, and other 
corroborating evidence, can demonstrate that a number of people were involved.’43 Here, the 
need for joint enterprise is definitely essential from the victim’s perspective as this allows the 
victim to feel safe and reassured that all potential offenders have been convicted. This source 
was unusual however in that it looked at the victim’s perspective and why they believe that 
joint enterprise is necessary- this could be because many believe that using joint enterprise as 
a tool to convict black and ethnic minority gangs outweighs the victim’s perspective. Therefore, 
it is clear to say that joint enterprise is a highly controversial topic within the media and will 
likely remain so due to the conflicting perspectives of the offender and the victim.  
Conclusion  
To conclude the Courts had been misinterpreting joint enterprise for the last 30 years. The 
courts showed the reason for this in R v Jogee, however despite this there have been very few 
successful appeals. More research would need to be untaken in order to conclude that a true 




                                               
42Sandra Paul, ‘why joint enterprise is unfair and needs changing’ (Law Society Gazette, 23 December 2014)  
43Carlene Firmin, ‘Joint enterprise law seem to unfairly target young people’ The Guardian, (22 July 2014)  
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